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ABSTRACT:    This paper proposes a 
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium 
(DSGE) model for the Serbian economy. 
It is a modification of the existing models 
of Goodhart, Osorio and Tsomocos (2009) 
and Martinez and Tsomocos (2012). The 
model introduces important features of the 
Serbian economy, financial dollarization 
and foreign ownership of the banking 
system, while retaining the most important 
element of the reference models, financial 
friction. To solve the model we use Dynare, 
a specialized Matlab program for solving 
DSGE models. The model is subject to three 
different shocks: monetary, productivity, 
and regulatory, and the results are 
presented in the form of impulse response 
functions. It is concluded that the proposed 
platform has good characteristics, but 
its complete application to the case of the 
Serbian economy requires further research.
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APPLICATION OF DYNAMIC STOCHASTIC 
GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODELS TO THE 
CASE OF THE SERBIAN ECONOMY***1. INTRODUCTION 
The recent economic crisis has indicated the inability of DSGE models to 
adequately address current economic issues. Certain authors (Quadrini 2011, 
Martinez and Tsomocos 2012) attribute the poor performance of the 
benchmark DSGE models to the absence of financial friction in their settings. 
Brunnermeier, Eisenbach, and Sannikov (2012, p. 1) have emphasized the 
crucial role of financial friction in understanding business cycle fluctuations. 
Tovar (2009, p. 6) explains that exclusion of the financial markets or financial 
friction prevents benchmark DSGE models from analyzing financial 
vulnerability, illiquidity, and procyclicality, and limits their use for stress testing 
in financial stability exercises. 
Although benchmark DSGE models have generally not included financial 
markets and financial friction, there is a long tradition of dealing with these 
elements in the macroeconomic theory. One of the earliest works in the field 
was by Bernanke and Getler (1989). Today, the leading examples of models with 
financial friction are Bernanke, Gelter, and Gilchrist (1999) and Kiyotaki and 
Moore (2012). Here asymmetric information in the form of entrepreneur moral 
hazard and costly state verification results in financial friction. Alternatively, 
Goodhart, Tsomocos, and Osorio (2009) and Tsomocos and Martinez (2012) 
introduce financial friction through the existence of money, default, and agent 
heterogeneity. Since these features are able to capture the first-order effects of 
financial friction in a parsimonious way, we decided to follow the concept of 
Tsomocos in the paper. 
The aim of this paper is to propose a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium 
(DSGE) model for the Serbian economy. The focus will be on the introduction 
of a DSGE model for a small, financially open, dollarized economy. The model 
proposed in the paper is based on the work of Goodhart et al (2009) and 
Tsomocos and Martinez (2012). These models are micro-founded models for a 
closed economy based on a real business cycle paradigm with financial frictions 
and they follow the framework developed in Dubey and Geanaklopos (2003) 
and Tsomocos (2003). The models of Goodhart et al (2009) and Tsomocos et al 
(2012) comprise the liquidity issues and endogenous default, two features 
present in the Serbian economy. However, due to the specificity of the Serbian 
economy it is necessary to extend and modify these models. Given that 
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environment is a very complex issue, this paper should be regarded as a first 
step in researching the phenomenon. 
Our proposed model extends the aforementioned models in the following ways. 
First, it introduces financial dollarization into the setting of the DSGE model. 
Although dollarization is presented in Castillo, Montoro, and Tuesta (2006), 
their model is based on the New Keynsian paradigm, there is no endogenous 
default, and it does not consider financial dollarization. Second, foreign 
ownership in the banking sector is introduced. Furthermore, in order to model 
financial dollarization it is necessary to introduce the exchange rate into the 
model. The exchange rate in the model is assumed to depend only on capital 
flow with foreign countries. In this way the proposed model extends the work of 
Tsomocos and Goodhart to the field of financially open economies. 
Dollarization refers to the use of foreign currency for all or some functions of 
domestic currency in the domestic economy. The focus will be only on partial 
financial dollarization,
1 where foreign currency becomes the preferred 
denomination for savings and loans. The literature (Levy Yeyati 2006, Alvarez-
Plata and Garcia-Herrero 2008, Aleksić, Đurđević, Palić and Tasić 2008) 
concentrates on the negative side of financial dollarization., A high level of 
financial dollarization has a negative effect on the monetary authority 
conducting monetary policy and on debtors’ ability to meet their obligations 
when the debt is in foreign currency and when there is exchange rate 
depreciation. In this paper the focus will be predominantly on these effects, 
while the mechanism of how dollarization affects economic life will be explained 
further in the part of the paper that deals with motivation. 
Another important feature that the previously mentioned models lack is that 
foreign banking groups own the majority of the Serbian banking sector. As part 
of international banking groups Serbian banks have access to funds with 
conditions they would not have otherwise. A similar case is described in 
                                                 
1   Dollarization can be complete, when foreign currency is a legal tender, and partial, when 
foreign currency is used along with domestic currency. Partial dollarization can be: 
transaction dollarization, price dollarization, or financial dollarization. For details see 
Castillo, Montoro and Tuesta (2006) 
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alternative source of finance makes banks less dependent on the liquidity 
provided by the Central Bank. Therefore foreign ownership might additionally 
affect transmission of monetary policy and its efficiency. Finally, since the 
Serbian economy is small compared to the size of the European Union 
economy, changes in Serbia in demand for funds from abroad would have a 
negligible effect on the financial markets of the European Union.  
The paper is organized as follows. The first section explains the motivation of 
our paper. The model is defined in the second section. The third part contains a 
numerical example of the model, and the last section concludes. 
2. MOTIVATION 
DSGE models are a very useful tool for economic policy analysis. However, as 
yet no DSGE model has been developed to analyse Serbian economic policy. 
This paper is motivated by the desire to start a discussion on the topic, and to 
contribute to the development of a DSGE model for the Serbian economy and 
the development of DSGE models for developing countries with dollarization 
issues in general.  
The following statistics show the extent of financial dollarization and foreign 
ownership in the Serbian banking sector, the consequences of which determined 
the introduction of these features in our proposed model. 
On the Serbian banking sector’s balance sheet, loans constitute almost 75% of total 
assets and securities just 9%
2. On the other hand, deposits make up almost 70% of 
liabilities
3. Thus loans and deposits play a dominant role in the balance sheets of 
Serbian banks. In this paper we will only focus on the currency structure of the 
loans and deposits to show the extent of the financial dollarization of the Serbian 
economy. The structure of loans and deposits in the Serbian economy in terms of 
denomination is presented in Figure 1 and Figure 2: 
                                                 
2    National Bank of Serbia (2012) BANKING SECTOR IN SERBIA: Third Quarter Report 
2012,page 7. 
3   National Bank of Serbia (2012) BANKING SECTOR IN SERBIA: Third Quarter Report 2012, 
pages 20-23. 
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(in billions of RSD) 
Figure 2: Currency structure of 
deposits (in billions of RSD) 
 
Source: National Bank of Serbia (2012), pp 9 and 21 
Euro-denominated loans and deposits strongly dominate loans and deposits in 
dinars (as well as other foreign currencies). Furthermore, the currency structure 
of deposits is harmonized with the currency structure of loans. Nevertheless, 
banks are not protected against the negative impact of unexpected changes in 
exchange rates. Exchange rate risk is transformed into default risk: when 
debtors’ revenue is in domestic currency and their credit obligations are in 
foreign currency, a change in the exchange rate will directly affect the amount of 
credit obligation. If the exchange rate depreciates the debtor will need more 
domestic currency to honour the debt, which increases in terms of domestic 
currency. Given that revenues stay relatively constant, a change in the exchange 
rate affects the debtor’s ability to honour the credit obligation in its entirety. 
This phenomenon is described, e..g. in Levy Yeyato (2006) and Božović, 
Urošević and Živković (2009).  
When such a large proportion of assets and liabilities is denominated in a 
foreign currency it affects the ability of the Central Bank to conduct monetary 
policy. In a regime of inflation targeting, the interest rate is supposed to be the 
most important channel for transmission of monetary policy. The interest rate 
channel implies that a change in the key rate is transmitted to other rates, which, 
under certain conditions, will later affect aggregate demand. However, a change 
in the key domestic rate will only affect the rates on loans in domestic currency. 
However, most of the loans are denominated in or indexed to a foreign 
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mainly EURIBOR, while domestic key interest rates do not affect them. 
Therefore the efficiency of the interest rate channel in conditions of high 
financial dollarization is significantly reduced. This statement is in accordance 
with the findings of Aleksić, Đurđević, Palić and Tasić (2008, pp. 28, 29), which 
argue that the effectiveness of this channel depends on the level of dollarization, 
and at the current level of dollarization its effectiveness is shaded.  
The ownership structure of Serbian banks is as follows: foreign-owned banks 
account for 74% of total assets, 74% of total capital, and 71% of employment in 
the banking sector, and post profits of RSD 17.5bn
4. The majority of the foreign 
owners of banks in the Serbian economy are from Eurozone countries
5. This 
fact might have encouraged dollarization (euroization) in Serbia. According to 
Dragutinović (2008), foreign ownership means that the banking sector is able to 
get foreign capital easily and is less sensitive to liquidity provided by the Central 
Bank. Therefore foreign ownership affects monetary policy and its efficiency. 
3. THE MODEL 
The model consists of one household, two yeoman farmers, a commercial and a 
Central Bank. ‘Yeoman farmer’ is a generic term in macroeconomics for the 
producer who partially consumes the goods he produces. The central place in 
the model belongs to the commercial bank, which acts as an intermediary 
between sectors with a deficit and sectors with a surplus of funds. The 
household is the labour provider and acts as a net depositor in the financial 
market, while the yeoman farmers provide consumer goods and act as net 
borrowers. The yeoman farmers differ in their ability to access different 
financial markets. The Central Bank, on the other hand, is a strategic dummy 
(i.e., its behaviour is not conditional on the state of the system), which partially 
provides liquidity to the system. In the model the commercial bank has a parent 
company, which is an alternative provider of liquidity to the commercial bank, 
but its behaviour is not the object of interest in this paper. It is only important 
                                                 
4   Source: National Bank of Serbia, BANKING SECTOR IN SERBIA: Third Quarter Report 
2012,, page 3. 
5   Source: National Bank of Serbia, BANKING SECTOR IN SERBIA: Third Quarter Report 
2012,, page 3. 
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requires at an interest rate determined outside of the model. Finally, the agents 
in the system are interconnected by a system of markets. The structure of the 
model is presented in Figure 3. 
Figure 3: Structure of the Model 
 
Source: Author's illustration 
Financial dollarization is introduced though partial deposit and loan 
dollarization. In other words, a part of deposits and loans are in foreign 
currency. For the sake of simplicity, instead of having deposits and loans in 
foreign currency, foreign-currency-indexed loans and deposits are introduced 
(hereinafter euro-indexed deposits and credits). Euro-indexed credits and 
deposits are regular credits and deposits with an exchange rate clause, i.e., the 
amount of outstanding debt in euro-indexed deposit and credit markets changes 
APPLICATION OF DSGE MODELS TO THE CASE OF SERBIA
41with changes in the exchange rate. In this way the same effect is achieved, but 
more simply, each time money relating to euro-indexed loans and deposits is 
changed. The exchange rate clause makes agents sensitive to changes in the 
exchange rate, while the quantity of euro-indexed loans and deposits means that 
the role of the exchange rate is very important in decision-making.  
The economy contains four different types of market: the financial market, the 
commodity market, the labour market, and the exchange rate market. The 
financial markets are the interbank market (between the Central Bank and the 
commercial bank), the domestic currency financial market (between the 
commercial bank and yeoman farmer γ), the euro-indexed deposit market 
(between the commercial bank and household α), and the euro-indexed loan 
market (between the commercial bank and yeoman farmer δ). Furthermore, the 
commodity market and the labour market both connect household α with 
yeoman farmer γ and yeoman farmer δ. In the labour market, the commodity 
market, the interbank market, the foreign exchange market, and the domestic 
financial market, the price or interest rate is determined by equating respective 
supply and demand, in the same way as in Goodhart et al (2009) and Martinez 
et al (2012). 
By contrast, interest rates in the euro-indexed loan and deposit markets are 
determined outside of the model. In the case of the Serbian economy, due to the 
currency structure of deposits and loans (see Figures 1 and 2), international 
interest rates such as Libor and Euribor play a dominant role. To implement 
this feature of the Serbian economy in the model the following assumption has 
been made: the commercial bank takes as many deposits as household α is 
willing to invest in the commercial bank at an interest rate level that is 
determined outside of the model. Furthermore, yeoman farmer δ accepts as 
many funds as the commercial bank is willing to invest in the euro-indexed loan 
market at the rate determined outside of the model. Thus, interest rates on euro-
indexed loans and deposits are equal to the sum of the interest rates in the 
international financial market, which is represented in the model by the interest 
rate on the loans from the parent company and premiums, which are all 
assumed to be constant in the model.  
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Yeoman farmer δ can only get a euro-indexed loan, while yeoman farmer γ can 
only get a loan in domestic currency. Furthermore, household α can only invest 
money in euro-indexed deposits. The division of yeoman farmers is conditioned 
by the need to have assets in different currencies in one model. On the other 
hand, from the currency structure of deposits (see Figure 2) it seems that the 
limitation on household investment does not diverge much from reality but 
makes the model more parsimonious.  
Financial openness is achieved because the commercial bank can borrow from 
abroad. Foreign ownership provides Serbian banks that belong to international 
banking groups with an option to borrow from the parent company. We treat 
Serbian economy as a small open economy. Thus, the interest rate on loans 
from the parent company does not vary with the amount of funds demanded by 
the commercial bank. Because the commercial bank has an alternative source of 
funding it is less dependent on the liquidity that the Central Bank provides.  
Our model extends the models of Goodhart et al (2009) and Martinez and 
Tsomocos (2012). We expand these models in terms of participants (a parent 
company and another yeoman farmer are added), markets (foreign exchange 
rate market and euro-indexed loan and deposit markets are added), and assets 
(euro-indexed loans and euro-indexed deposits are added). In regard to 
Goodhart et al (2009) the model is simplified so that there is no bank 
heterogeneity. The omission of bank heterogeneity has little effect on the main 
findings of the paper while facilitating both tracking of shock propagation 
throughout the model and explanation of the results. The model differs from 
Martinez and Tsomocos (2012), as there is production and deposit of funds 
while the agents are not endowed with consumer goods. 
3.2 Financial Friction 
In the model, financial friction is represented by money, default, market 
liquidity, and agent heterogeneity. These frictions are the key ingredients of the 
models of Martinez and Tsomocos (2012) and Goodhart et al (2009), and as the 
proposed model is based on their papers these frictions are also part of our 
model. The following paragraphs explain the role of financial friction in the 
model. 
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amount of outstanding debt they pay. Similar to in Martinez and Tsomocos 
(2012), the cost of default is given by a penalty that reduces utility and which 
can be regarded as a reputation sanction as the loan obligation is not fulfilled in 
its entirety and which is proportional to the unpaid amount of loan obligation. 
On the other hand, money is introduced via cash-in-advance constraint. It is a 
requirement that every consumer or firm must have sufficient money before 
they can buy a good. In the model, commodities and assets can only be traded 
for money, while all assets are only delivered in money. Since the yeoman 
farmers do not have the required money at the time of the trade, they have to 
borrow prior to the purchase. Some of the money already exists in the system 
due to household deposits in the bank, but the other part has to come from 
outside. Money enters the system in three ways: through open market 
operations, borrowing from abroad, and small government subsidies. Open 
market operations (OMO) represent the Central Bank lending to the 
commercial bank via the interbank market (Repo Market). Borrowing from 
abroad is represented by the commercial bank borrowing from its parent 
company. Finally, small government subsidy is the constant amount of money 
that both yeoman farmers get at the beginning of each period to reduce the level 
of default on their loan obligations.  
Market liquidity is represented by the proportion of proceedings from sales that 
is available to the agents at the moment of purchase. In the model a very high 
level of illiquidity is assumed; hence the sales’ proceedings are available to the 
agent only at the end of the period and so cannot be used to make purchases in 
the current period. If the agents do not have other sources of finance they will 
have to borrow from the commercial bank in order to consume. Contrary to 
Goodhart et al (2009) where low level of liquidity refers only to the commodity 
market, the low level of liquidity in this model refers to both commodity and 
labour markets.  
Although the assumption of a representative agent facilitates the process of 
solving the model it prevents the model from addressing some relevant issues in 
economic theory. Without agent heterogeneity there will be no trading between 
agents, and consequently no default. Absence of default is in stark contrast to 
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proposed model there are three classes of agent: the producers, the consumer, 
and the intermediary. Since they differ in goals and endowment their decisions 
and consequently their reaction to shocks will also differ. In this way the model 
is suitable for analysing complex economic phenomena. 
The existence of financial frictions, particularly liquidity and default, allows 
monetary policy to be non-neutral in the short run. On the other hand, financial 
frictions do not prevent monetary policy from being neutral in the long run. In 
this way the proposed model is able to overcome the classic dichotomy in the 
short run. The model is in accordance with New Keynesian literature, where 
monetary neutrality holds only in the long run, albeit short-run neutrality is 
obtained through other means. In addition, it is in accordance with RBC 
literature, but only in the long run, since money neutrality in RBC models holds 
in both the short and long run. 
3.3 Timing Convention 
Every period starts with a realization of the state of nature,defined by a shock or 
its absence. After the shock has occurred the agents decide on their action. In 
the process of decision-making the agents take prices as given. Once they have 
made their decision the following chain of events occurs.  
Firstly, the Central Bank lends money to the commercial bank (i.e., the domestic 
interbank meets). Then the commercial bank borrows money from abroad and 
repays its previous-period loan obligations to the foreign lender. 
Simultaneously, the foreign exchange market meets. Furthermore, the yeoman 
farmers repay the previous-period loans with revenue from commodity sales. 
Due to liquidity issues the revenue from commodity sales and the revenue from 
the labour market come to the commodity seller or labour provider with one 
period lag in regards to the period that the commodity or labour was purchased. 
With the money obtained, the commercial bank can now repay its previous-
period loans to the household and the Central Bank. The debt obligation to the 
foreign lender has already been honoured, since it was one of the conditions of 
determining the exchange rate. Afterwards the household deposits some of the 
money from the commercial bank and the labour market into the bank and 
sends the rest to the commodity market. Also, the household sends part of its 
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from the Central Bank and the household and money borrowed from abroad to 
lend to the yeoman farmers. The yeoman farmers use money to hire labour (i.e., 
the labour market meets) and produce the commodity. Next, the yeoman 
farmers send part of the produced goods to the commodity market. Finally, the 
commodity market meets and agents consume the goods.  
We assume that the Central Bank is willing to make a new loan to the 
commercial bank before it has repaid its previous-period loan to that 
institution. However, this assumption does not affect the decision-making of the 
commercial bank, though it does allow the exchange rate to be determined 
before other agents repay their previous-period loan obligations. In other words, 
the commercial bank does not use money borrowed from the Central Bank to 
repay its previous-period loan obligation to that institution. On the contrary, 
these funds are taken from the Central Bank with the intention of lending them 
to the yeoman farmer and they will be used for that purpose, but the 
commercial bank temporarily uses part of them to repay the previous-period 
loan obligation to the lender abroad. Once the, yeoman farmers have repaid 
their previous-period loan obligations, the money that should be used to repay 
the commercial bank loan obligation to the foreign lender is used for lending to 
domestic agents, since the obligation to the foreign lender has already been 
honoured.  
3.4 Household α 
Household α is a risk-averse agent that maximizes the discounted sum of 
lifetime utility with decision vector σ
α = {bt
α, wt
α, dt
eu} t=0
inf. It obtains utility by 
consuming goods and by leisure time. Household α is endowed with some 
amount of time that can be spent either in leisure or working. Work provides it 
with money that can be used to buy consumer goods. On the other hand, leisure 
also has a positive effect on utility. Hence, household α always faces a trade-off 
between consumption and leisure. Furthermore, since household α has access to 
the financial market, it can deposit a certain amount of money with the 
commercial bank. In this way α can smooth its consumption, because it can 
carry over a part of today’s consumption to some future period when economic 
factors might prevent household α from consuming at its desired level. The 
same applies to the situation where economic factors prevent household α from 
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increase consumption today at the expense of future periods. Household α 
differs from the household in Goodhart et al (2009) because it is not the owner 
of the bank and it invests in euro-indexed deposits. The optimization problem α 
faces is given below: 
inf
0
0
{ ( ) ( )} max
t t
t Y
t
b
E U Uh w
p 



  
 (1) 
subject to: 
1
1 1 1 1 ) 1 (

       
t
t eu
t t
eu
t t
l
t
eu
t t f
f
r v d w p d b
    (2) 
(i.e., good expenditure + investment in euro-indexed deposits at time t = labour 
income carried forward from period t-1 + repayment of euro-indexed deposit 
from period t-1) 
where:  
U - utility function 
bt
α - amount of money sent by α to purchase consumer goods at time t 
dt
eu – euro-indexed deposits made by α at time t 
pt
Y – price of consumer goods at time t 
pt
l
 - wage paid for unit of labour at time t  
ft - exchange rate at time t 
h
α - α's time endowment 
wt
α - amount of time α chooses to work in period t 
(h
α - wt
α) – amount of time α chooses to spend in leisure in period t 
(bt
α/ pt
Y) – consumption of household α at time t 
rt
eu - interest rate in euro-indexed deposit market in period t 
vt
θ – deposit repayment rate by commercial bank in period t 
β - discount factor 
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Yeoman farmer is a generic term in macroeconomics for the producer who 
partially consumes the goods he produces. Yeoman farmer γ maximizes the sum 
of lifetime utility with decision vector σ
γ={bt
γ, qt
γ, vt
γ, μt
γ} t=0
inf. He obtains utility 
by consuming consumer goods and suffers penalties for defaulting on loan 
obligations. Yeoman farmer γ has the same discount factor as household α. 
Yeoman farmer γ resembles the yeoman farmer in the paper by Goodhart et al 
(2009), but they differ in that the yeoman farmer in this paper pays a non-
pecuniary default penalty. 
To produce consumer goods, yeoman farmer γ uses a production function 
which depends on technology and labour. He hires labour on the labour market 
from household α. Since γ’s utility depends on the consumption of the 
consumer good, part of the production he holds for himself while selling the 
other part on the consumer goods market. Furthermore, the cash-in-advance 
constraint requires that the agent has sufficient funds prior to making the 
purchase. In the case of yeoman farmer γ this means he needs to borrow from 
the commercial bank on the domestic currency loan market. Later he repays his 
debt with profits accumulated from the proceeds of the last-period consumer 
goods sale and a small amount of government aid (subsidy). Partial or complete 
default on his loan is an option, although γ suffers a default penalty 
proportional to the amount of the loan he did not honour. Hence, the default 
penalty is non-pecuniary and it lowers his utility. The optimization problem 
that yeoman farmer γ faces is given below:  
inf
01
0
{ ( ) (1 ) } max
t
t t t tt E UY q v

   

     
 (3) 
subject to: 
) ( l
t
t
t t p
b
A Y

  ; (4) 
(i.e., amount of the consumer good produced in period t = total productivity 
factor * the amount of labour γ used to produce the consumer good in period t) 
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Y
t t t q p m v ; (5) 
(i.e., loan repayment to the domestic financial market at time t = subsidy + sales 
revenue carried forward from period t-1)  
rsd
t
t
t r
b


1

 
 (6) 
(i.e., payroll payment at time t = borrowing from domestic financial market at 
time t) 
Furthermore, mutual technological factor At and γ’s default penalty are 
represented by the AR(1) process because they will be the subject of the 
exogenous shock in the simulation section. 
A
t t t e A A A     ) ln( 5 . 0 ) ln( 5 . 0 ) ln( 1  ;  ) , 0 (
2
A
A
t N e    (7) 
       t t t e     ) ln( 5 . 0 ) ln( 5 . 0 ) ln( 1  ;  ) , 0 (
2

  N et   (8) 
where: 
U - utility function 
Yt
γ - production of consumer goods by γ in period t 
qt
γ - amount of goods offered for sale by γ in period t 
(Yt
γ - qt
γ) – γ’s consumption of consumer goods in period t 
pt
Y – price of consumer goods at time t 
μt
γ - debt acquired by γ on the domestic financial market in period t 
vt
γ - γ 's repayment rate on his outstanding loan in period t 
rt 
rsd - interest rate on loans from domestic financial market extended in period t 
bt
γ - amount of money sent by γ to hire labour at time t 
pt
l
 - wage paid for unit of labour at time t  
(bt
γ/ pt
l ) – quantity of labour that γ hires  
At – total productivity factor in period t 
A - total productivity factor parameter  
m
γ - government subsidy 
ft - exchange rate at time t 
τr
γ - default penalty on outstanding debt in period t 
  - γ’s default penalty parameter 
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493.6 Yeoman Farmer δ 
Yeoman farmer δ differs from yeoman farmer γ in two major characteristics. 
Firstly, yeoman farmer δ only has access to the euro-indexed loan market, while 
yeoman farmer γ only has access to the domestic currency financial market. 
Secondly, yeoman farmer δ is modelled to be willing to accept as much money 
as the commercial bank is willing to invest in the euro-indexed loan market. In 
other words, the yeoman farmer is assumed to have perfectly elastic demand for 
funds on the euro-indexed loan market at the given rate r
B,eu. Therefore, he 
maximizes the sum of his lifetime utility with respective decision vector σ
δ = 
{qt
δ, vt
δ} t=0
inf. 
inf
,
0 11
0 1
{ ( ) (1 ) (1 ) } max
t eu B eu t
t t tt t
t
f
E UY q v d r
f 
  

 

   
 (9) 
subject to: 
) ( l
t
t
t t p
b
A Y

   (10) 
(i.e., δ’s production at time t = total productivity factor * amount of the labour 
bought on the labour market at time t)  
  
1 1
1
,
1 1 ) 1 (  

     t
Y
t
t
t eu B
t
eu
t t q p m
f
f
r d v  (11) 
(i.e., loan repayment to euro-indexed loan market at time t = subsidy + sales 
revenue carried forward from period t-1) 
eu
t t d b 
 ; (12) 
(i.e., meeting payroll at time t = borrowing from euro-indexed loan market at 
time t) 
where: 
U - utility function 
Yt
δ - production of consumer goods by δ in period t 
qt
δ - amount of consumer goods offered for sale by δ in period t 
vt
δ - δ's repayment rate on his outstanding debt in period t 
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Y– price of consumer goods at time t 
μt
δ - debt acquired by δ on the euro-indexed loan market in period t 
rt 
B,eu - interest rate in euro-indexed loan market in period t 
bt
δ - amount of money sent by δ to hire labour at time t 
At – total productivity factor in period t 
τ
δ - δ’s default penalty on outstanding debt 
m
δ – government subsidy 
ft - exchange rate at time t 
pt
l
 - wage paid for unit of labour at time t  
3.7 Commercial Bank θ 
The commercial bank acts as an intermediary that connects sectors with surplus 
and sectors with deficit in funds. It takes deposits from household α and loans 
from the Central Bank and its parent company. On the other hand, it extends 
credit in the domestic financial market and euro-indexed loan market. Deposits 
from euro-indexed loans are only used for euro-indexed loans, while loans from 
the Central Bank and parent company are used for loans in the domestic 
financial market.  
The commercial bank is hedged against a change in the exchange rate. 
Primarily, the total amount of the funds the commercial bank invests in the 
euro-indexed loan market is equal to the amount that it gathers in the euro-
indexed loan market. This loan and deposit structure does not differ much from 
the reality, presented in Figures  1 and 2. In this way the  commercial bank 
transfers the exchange rate risk to the other participants in the model. On the 
other hand, the loans the commercial bank gets from its parent company are 
modelled not to vary with the change in exchange rate. Hence, the commercial 
bank is hedged against exchange rate risk.  
However, the fact that the commercial bank transferred the exchange rate risk to 
the other participants does not mean it has solved the problems related to 
dollarization. Given that the agent’s costs are affected by the change in the 
exchange rate while revenues are not, the risk of exchange rate change is 
converted to default risk. In the model liquidity issues cause the phenomenon 
mention above, albeit that in reality there are many other reasons that can have 
same effect.  
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51The commercial bank maximizes the net present value of the flows of the 
expected profit with decision vector σ 
θ={Πt
 θ, lt
 θ, μt
IB,μt
IB,eu,vt
 θ}t=0
inf. It suffers a 
non-pecuniary reputation penalty for defaulting on its debt obligations 
proportional to the size of the non-repaid amount of the obligation. 
Furthermore, it is assumed that the commercial bank can default on the loan 
from the Central Bank and deposit from household α, but cannot default on the 
loan from its parent company. Besides the default penalty, the commercial bank 
suffers a penalty for borrowing money from its parent company. Loans from the 
parent company have the status of an additional source of funding that the 
commercial bank uses when it cannot gather enough funds from other sources, 
primarily households. In this way, anytime the commercial bank borrows from 
its parent company it sends a negative message to the public that the 
commercial bank is not able to attract the funds it needs, or, even more general, 
that agents do not sufficiently trust the banking system. Therefore, the ratio of 
the funds borrowed from the parent company to the funds gathered from 
households can be an indicator of the power the commercial bank has in the 
economy. The decreased power of the commercial bank has a negative effect on 
its image: in the same way as default, a bad image negatively affects a bank’s 
reputation. A lower reputation should lower the utility function of the 
commercial bank, because the commercial bank’s utility function, loosely 
speaking, depends on the profit and reputation of the bank. The bank differs 
from the banks in Goodhart et al (2009) and Martinez and Tsomocos (2012) 
since it has access to funds abroad but suffers penalties by borrowing abroad, 
and it gives different types of loans to different agents. 
The optimization problem that the commercial bank faces is given below:  
,
, , inf
,1 ,2
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market for loans made at time t-1 – repayments on the loans and deposits taken 
at time t-1) 
) 1 ( ) 1 (
,
,
eu IB
t
eu IB
t t
IB
t
IB
t
t r
f
r
l




    (15) 
(i.e., extensions to the domestic financial market at time t = loans from the 
interbank market and from the parent company at time t) 
where: 
U - utility function 
μt
IB - debt that commercial bank acquires in the interbank market in period t 
μt
IB,eu - commercial bank’s debt to parent company (in foreign currency) in 
period t 
dt
eu - euro-indexed deposits made by α at time t 
rt
IB,eu – interest rate on the loans from parent company at time t 
rt
IB – interbank interest rate at time t 
Πt
 θ – commercial bank’s profit  
vt
γ - γ 's repayment rate on his outstanding debt in period t 
lt
 θ - loans to domestic financial market 
vt
 θ – θ’s repayment rate on its outstanding debt in period t 
τ
 θ,1 – reputation penalty for defaulting on outstanding debt 
τ
θ,2 – reputation penalty for borrowing from the parent company 
β
B – discount factor for commercial bank 
3.8 Interbank Market 
The interbank market clears when the amount of money the commercial bank 
promises to repay in the next period is exchanged for the credit extension the 
Central Bank offers in the current period. 
t
IB
t IB
t M
r

  1  (16) 
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533.9 Domestic Financial Market 
The domestic financial market clears when the amount of money yeoman 
farmer γ promises to repay in the next period is exchanged for the credit 
extension in domestic currency that the commercial bank offers in the current 
period. 

 
t
t rsd
t l
r   1  (17) 
3.10 Consumer Goods Market 
In every period, the consumer goods market clears when the amount of money 
household α offered for consumer goods is exchanged for the quantity of 
consumer goods yeoman farmers γ and δ offered for sale.  
 

t t
t Y
t q q
b
p

   (18) 
3.11 Labour Market 
In every period, the labour market clears when labour expenditures by yeoman 
farmers γ and δ are exchanged for the amount of hours that household α is 
willing to work. 

 
t
t t l
t w
b b
p

   (19) 
3.12 Exchange Rate Market 
In every period, the foreign exchange rate equates supply and demand for 
foreign exchange. The amount of credit that the commercial bank borrows from 
its parent company and the constant amount of foreign exchange that the 
parent company has to pay to the authority (M
eu) form a supply of foreign 
exchange. On the other hand, repayment of the previous-period debt obligation 
to the parent company by the commercial bank and the previous-period profits 
of the commercial bank form demand for foreign exchange. Here, it is assumed 
that repayment of the commercial bank’s previous-period debt to the parent 
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from its parent company.  
11 1
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 (20) 
3. 13 Euro-indexed Deposit and Loan Market 
The euro-indexed loan and deposit market differs from the other markets 
because interest rates are not determined through the interaction of supply and 
demand but are given exogenously. Therefore, so that both markets clear 
(clearing of all the markets is one of the conditions of equilibrium in DSGE 
models), it is necessary to assume that the commercial bank is willing to accept 
as much money as household α is willing to deposit at a given level of the euro-
indexed deposit interest rate. The commercial bank is willing to do so, since 
yeoman farmer δ is modelled to be willing to accept as many funds as the 
commercial bank offers on that market. 
3.14 Monetary Policy 
The monetary policy follows Goodhart et al (2009) and Martinez and Tsomocos 
(2012). In every period the Central Bank injects a certain amount of money into 
the system. It does so through open market operations (OMO). When it wants 
to decrease the amount of money in the system and increase the interest rate on 
loans in domestic currency, the Central Bank decreases the level of OMOs. 
_
M M
CB
t t    (23) 
CB
t
CB
t
CB CB
t e     ) ln( 5 . 0 ) ln( 5 . 0 ) ln( 1     ;  ) , 0 (
2
CB
CB
t N e    (24) 
where: 
Mt – amount of money injected into the system by the Central Bank at time t 
M - amount of the money injected into the system by the Central Bank in 
steady state  
ηt
CB - the monetary operations’ gross growth at time t 
CB  - the monetary operations’ gross growth parameter 
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553.15 Equilibrium 
According to the definition of DSGE models, a system is always in equilibrium. 
Equilibrium can come in two different modalities, long-run equilibrium and 
short-run equilibrium. Long-run equilibrium is a static equilibrium and is 
referred to as a steady state. 
Short-run equilibrium is achieved if: 
1.  agents optimize their utility functions given their budget set; 
2.  all markets clear; 
3.  expectations are rational. 
The system is always in short-run equilibrium. However, in order to have long-
run equilibrium as well, two additional conditions are required. The system is in 
long-run equilibrium (steady state) if: 
1.  agents optimize their utility functions given their budget set; 
2.  all markets clear; 
3.  expectations are rational; 
4.  all variables do not grow; 
5.  the economy is not subject to any current or expected shock. 
4. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE 
The numerical example aims to give a basic intuition of how the model works. 
However, the calibration that will allow deeper analysis of the Serbian economy 
is a task for further development of the model. The tables below show the 
parameter values and steady-state values of endogenous values used in 
simulations. 
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Parameters  Value    Endo. var.  Value 
A   2.10   pY 2.262398516297142 
hα  1.00   pl 3.959197403520000 
1+ rIB,eu  1.030   f  110.00 
    3.753160441047400  1+rRSD  1.20 
    15.00   1+rIB  1.1175 
1 ,     43.200276481769485   M  0.2651 
2 ,     5.362446084360822   A  2.10 
mγ 0.028875     ηCB 1.00 
mδ  0.0289667575   deu  1.447 
β  1/1.0296   bα  1.9718312 
βB  1/1.02   ηα -0.507142802081639 
_
M   0.2651   wα 0.487219959854739 
Meu 2.695909090909087e-004   μγ  0.5784 
1+rB,eu  1.070   bγ  0.482 
1+reu  1.040   η1
γ  -15.00 
CB    1.00   η2
γ -17.482517482517480 
Source: Author's calculation  q γ 0.225318393876213 
     v γ 0.93125 
     τ γ 15.00 
     ηδ -3.753160441047400 
     qδ  0.646248302174882 
     vδ 0.963022403748652 
     Πθ  0.023148 
     μIB  0.29624925 
     μIB,eu 0.002030972727273 
     η1
θ -43.200276481769485 
     η2
θ -47.329714674879803 
     lθ 0.481999939995261 
     vθ 0.99 
     Source: Author's calculation
4.2 Simulations 
The purpose of this section is to describe the change of the endogenous 
variables due to the set of exogenous shocks. Simulations are run for three 
different shocks: monetary shock, productivity shock, and regulatory shock. All 
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57of the simulations are run for a small shock, i.e., 1% change in the respective 
steady-state value. In all cases, shock unexpectedly hits the system at beginning 
of the first period and provokes the reaction of the agents, who adjust their 
behaviour accordingly. In simulations, all the agents have logarithmic utility 
functions. The model is simulated using Dynare software
6. 
4.3 Monetary Shock 
Monetary shock stands for a change in the OMO growth rate (
CB
t  ) in the initial 
period. From equation (23) it is clear that a change in the OMO determines the 
amount of liquidity the Central Bank injects into the system. Thus, the following 
simulation shows the reaction of the participants in the model to the unexpected 
1% decrease in the amount of liquidity the Central Bank injects into the system. 
Graphs 5.1 to 5.18 summarize the effects of the monetary shock at the beginning 
of the first period. 
As might be expected, a negative monetary shock increases domestic currency 
interest rates. However, the impulse response function of the interest rates on 
domestic currency loans (rt
RSD) differs from that of the interest rate on the 
interbank market (rt
IB), because the commercial bank has the possibility to 
borrow money from its parent company. In this way the possibility of 
borrowing from abroad negatively affects the transmission of monetary policy 
and the usefulness of the interest rate channel.  
Although the system is modelled in such a way that a change in domestic 
monetary policy does not change interest rates on euro-indexed loans and 
deposits (rt
B,eu,rt
eu), monetary policy does change the level of default in the 
economy. Since the commercial bank can borrow from abroad if the Central 
Bank runs a restrictive monetary policy, a negative monetary shock implicitly 
leads to an increased supply of foreign currency and decreases the foreign 
exchange rate. Because yeoman farmer δ’s debt obligation depends on the 
exchange rate, a decrease in the exchange rate means lower debt obligation for 
yeoman farmer δ and consequently a lower level of default. Given that the 
negative monetary shock has almost no effect on the default of yeoman farmer 
                                                 
6   In the paper, first-order approximation is used. For details, see Julliard (2001) and Adjemian 
et al. (2011).  
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commercial bank.  
Negative monetary shock has a negative effect on the price of consumer goods 
and labour. Due to the lower level of funds available to the yeoman farmers for 
hiring labour, wages decrease and household α offers less units of labour on the 
labour market. Since the commercial bank does not compensate for the negative 
monetary shock entirely and household α reduces investment in deposits, the 
yeoman farmers have less funds available for hiring labour. The decrease in the 
exchange rate reduces the return of household α on its deposit investment prior 
to the occurrence of the shock and the amount of funds it has at its disposal, 
affecting negatively its deposit investments in the current period. Furthermore, 
the smaller amount of labour available on the labour market reduces overall 
production and consumption. This is proof that monetary policy has real 
effects, since the change in monetary policy leads to a change in agents’ 
production and consumption. On the other hand the price of consumer goods 
also decreases. It is reduced because household α spends less in the consumer 
market due to its reduced budget. 
After the initial period the effect of the shock starts to vanish and the variables 
slowly return to a steady state. Some of the variables diverge from their steady-
state values for a few periods after the initial period, but after that they start to 
converge back to the steady state. This is because borrowing from the parent 
company decreases slower than the borrowing from the Central Bank recovers.  
Finally, this simulation proves the importance of the exchange rate to the 
transmission of monetary policy. This is because most of the changes in the 
system result from the change in the exchange rate. On the other hand, the 
interest rate channel has relatively low impact in the given setting. Furthermore, 
it is proved that the ability of the commercial bank to borrow from abroad 
prevents the Central Bank from controlling the amount of liquidity in the 
system. Default also follows the expected pattern. In the end, the dominant 
effect of default on euro-indexed loans on default in the whole system might be 
expected, bearing in mind the currency structure in the model.  
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59Graph 5.1 – change of p
Y due to the change of M  
Graph 5.2 - change of p
l due to the change of M 
Graph 5.3 - change of r
IB due to the change of M 
Graph 5.4 - change of r
RSD due to the change of M 
Graph 5.5 - change of f due to the change of M 
Graph 5.6 - change of b
α due to the change of M 
Graph 5.7 - change of d
EU due to the change of M 
Graph 5.8 - change of w due to the change of M 
Graph 5.9 - change of μ
γ due to the change of M 
 
Source: Author's calculation 
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γ due to the change of M  
Graph 5.11 - change of v
γ due to the change of M 
Graph 5.12 - change of q
γ due to the change of M 
Graph 5.13 - change of v
δ due to the change of M 
Graph 5.14 - change of q
δ due to the change of M 
Graph 5.15 - change of l
θ due to the change of M 
Graph 5.16 - change of v
θ due to the change of M 
Graph 5.17 - change of μ
IB,eu due to the change of M 
Graph 5.18 - change of μ
IB due to the change of M 
 
Source: Author's calculation 
4.4 Productivity Shock 
Productivity shock stands for a change in the technological factor (At) in the 
initial period. Shock is supposed to affect the production functions of both 
yeoman farmers, because they do not differ in terms of production technology. 
Thus, the following simulation shows the reaction of the participants in the 
model to the unexpected 1% increase of productivity of technology in the initial 
period. Graphs 6.1 to 6.3 summarize the effects of the productivity shock at the 
beginning of the first period. 
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also has a positive effect on the amount of consumer goods farmers supply to 
the consumer goods market. Due to increased supply the price of consumer 
goods decreases. Finally, the productivity shock affects the other variables such 
as interest rates and exchange rate, but the effect is so small that it can be 
ignored.  
The productivity shock reveals the importance of interest rates and especially 
exchange rate to the duration of the effect of the shock. Since it has very little 
effect on these variables the shock affects the system for a very short period.  
Graph 6.1 – change of p
Y due to the change of A  
Graph 6.2 - change of q
γ due to the change of A 
Graph 6.3 - change of q
δ due to the change of A 
 
Source: Author's calculation 
4.5 Regulatory Shock 
The following simulation shows the effect of an unexpected 1% increase of the 
default penalty to yeoman farmer γ (τt
γ) in the initial period. Graphs 7.1 to 7.18 
summarize the effects of the regulatory shock at the beginning of the first 
period. 
As might be expected, an increase in the default penalty enhances the debt 
repayment rate of yeoman farmer γ. However, in the initial period the 
repayment rate stays at the steady-state level and increases only after the initial 
period. This is because yeoman farmer γ does not have strategic space to 
increase his repayment rate, due to the decisions he made in the previous 
period. Only after the occurrence of the shock can he change his previous 
decision and decrease the level of default. This is the reason yeoman farmer γ’s 
default starts to decrease after the first period. 
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willing to borrow more from the Central Bank and parent company. Hence, it 
provokes an increase in the interbank market interest rate and a decrease in the 
exchange rate. It also has a negative effect on the domestic financial market 
interest rate, because the amount of funds available for lending increases.  
Similarly to the case of negative monetary shock, exchange rate decrease drives 
down wages, the amount of labour household α sends to the labour market, and 
overall production and consumption. The reduced budget of household α has a 
negative effect on the price of consumer goods. Furthermore, the lower 
exchange rate increases the repayment rate of yeoman farmer δ and the 
commercial bank. Since the amount of euro-indexed loans is much greater than 
the amount of loans in domestic currency, the repayment rate of the 
commercial bank follows the pattern of yeoman farmer δ’s repayment rate.  
Finally, after the initial shock the variables converge slowly to a steady state. 
However, some of the variables do not start to converge immediately after the 
first period. Because the foreign exchange rate increases faster than the amount 
of money that the commercial bank borrows from its parent company 
decreases, the amount of money the commercial bank offers on the domestic 
financial market increases. This is the reason why some of the variables, e.g., r
RSD 
and b
γ, diverge from the steady state after the initial shock, and then start to 
converge. 
Regulatory shock proves the findings from the monetary shock. The importance 
of the exchange rate is shown once again, since the level of production decreases 
despite the decrease in the interest rate in the domestic financial market. Also, it 
is shown that default in the whole system strongly depends on the level of 
default on the euro-indexed loans.  
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63Graph 7.1 – change of p
Y due to the change of τ
γ  
Graph 7.2 - change of p
l due to the change of τ
γ 
Graph 7.3 - change of r
IB due to the change of τ
γ 
Graph 7.4 - change of r
RSD due to the change of τ
γ 
Graph 7.5 - change of f due to the change of τ
γ 
Graph 7.6 - change of b
α due to the change of τ
γ 
Graph 7.7 - change of d
EU due to the change of τ
γ 
Graph 7.8 - change of w due to the change of τ
γ 
Graph 7.9 - change of μ
γ due to the change of τ
γ 
 
Source: Author's calculation 
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γ due to the change of τ
γ  
Graph 7.11 - change of v
γ due to the change of τ
γ 
Graph 7.12 - change of q
γ due to the change of τ
γ 
Graph 7.13 - change of v
δ due to the change of τ
γ 
Graph 7.14 - change of q
δ due to the change of τ
γ 
Graph 7.15- change of l
θ due to the change of τ
γ; 
Graph 7.16 - change of v
θ due to the change of τ
γ 
Graph 7.17- change of μ
IB,eu due to the change of τ
γ 
Graph 7.18 - change of μ
IB due to the change of τ
γ 
 
Source: Author's calculation 
5. CONCLUSION 
In this paper the inability of existing DSGE models to depict the Serbian 
economy is emphasized. This inability is attributed to a lack of specific features 
that significantly impact the operation of the Serbian economy, such as financial 
dollarization and foreign ownership of the banks. Here these features are 
applied, producing a model that can be applied to the Serbian economy. 
The proposed model shows that the interest rate channel has relatively low 
impact on economic activity, firstly because most of the assets are denominated 
APPLICATION OF DSGE MODELS TO THE CASE OF SERBIA
65in foreign currency and change of the reference rate does not affect the 
international interest rate on which they rely, and secondly because the 
alternative source of funding hinders the transmission of the impulse from 
reference rate to interest rates on commercial loans.  
On the other hand, the foreign exchange rate is shown to have a very important 
role. Firstly, its change affects the level of the default and its transmission 
throughout the system. Hence there is a link between exchange rate risk and 
default risk. Secondly, it has an effect on the level of activity in the economy 
through its effect on the wealth of the agents in the model.  
Finally, it is shown that banks are less sensitive to the amount of liquidity the 
Central Bank provides to the system when they have an alternative source of 
funding. However, it also leads to the conclusion that the Central Bank has 
difficulty regulating the level of liquidity in the system when banks have an 
alternative source of financing.  
The application of the additional features did not affect the main characteristics 
of the reference models. Firstly, the structure of the model has not changed 
drastically. Secondly, financial frictions still exist and still play a crucial role in 
the functioning of the system. Finally, the system is still non-dichotomous in the 
short run.  
However, these results are obtained by making some assumptions and 
simplifications. These assumptions and simplifications represent the limitations 
of the model, although they are crucial for the existence of the same. 
Furthermore, the parameters have a degree of subjectivity, so the strength of the 
reaction to the shock and the process of return to the steady state have a dose of 
arbitrariness. On the other hand, methods based on Bayesian interference or 
maximum likelihood can be used for finding parameters. However, their 
application might be hindered by the lack of relevant data. 
The proposed model incorporates elements of the Serbian economy and its 
findings are in accordance with the characteristics of the Serbian economy 
outlined at the beginning of the paper and basic economic logic. Hence, it can 
be said that the reference model, with the modifications made, is applicable to 
the Serbian economy. However, further research is still needed. One direction 
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simplifications which are the limitations of the model. Another possible 
direction is the calibration and parameterization of the model. Given that DSGE 
models that rely on the work of Goodhart and Tsomocos are still in the 
development stage, calibration and parameterization could be the field for 
further development of all these models. 
In the end it can be concluded that, although the proposed model has good 
characteristics, it should be regarded just as a first step in the application of 
DSGE models to the Serbian economy. Complete application of the DSGE 
approach to the Serbian economy requires further research in the directions 
proposed in this paper. 
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